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Abstract
Economic globalization refers to three related processes: 1) the growth in the world
economy, 2) the change in the relations between first and third world countries that has
resulted from the use of information technologies to re rganize production nationally and
globally, and 3) the integration of world financial markets. These processes are often held
responsible for deindustrialization in advanced industrial societies, increases in income
inequality, and pressures on welfare states to transform worker protection and benefits. I
demonstrate that the changes in the world economy are much smaller, more gradual, and
unevenly spread across societies than the globalization thesis suggests. More important, the
links between globalization and its alleged negative outcomes are tenuous at best. The rhetoric
of globalization has more to do with the U.S. and changes in its political economy than
changes in world trade. A brief concluding discussion considers how this is playing out in
western Europe.
2Introduction
There is a lot of discussion today about the issue of the globalization of the world
economy and its ultimate effects on governments and stratification in both the advanced
and less advanced industrial societies. This paper considers more closely the case of the
OECD countries and the alleged impact of globalization on welfare states. I focus on
questioning the rhetoric both empirically and normatively. My main conclusion is that
under most definitions of globalization, the evidence that exists just does not support the
view that the growth of the world economy has altered the organiza ion of production
and the nature of competition for most world markets. Moreover, if one explores the
empirical literature on the topic, one concludes that however one defines the "new global
competition", it is not strongly related to dein ustrialization, increases in income
inequality, nor the fiscal crises of welfare states.
Instead, deindustrialization reflects technological change and the continued shift
from manufacturing to services in advanced industrial societies. The political responses
to these changes have been radically different in the U.S. and western Europe. In
western Europe, governments have continued to intervene in their economies and the
distinct French, German, Italian, and Scandinavian business systems remain in place.
Governments continue to provide more for their citizens and income inequality has
changed little in the past 15 years.
In contrast, the U.S. over this period undertook a set of political reforms that
deregulated business activities, lowered taxes particularly for the well-off, made it more
difficult for labor to rganize, and tried to dismantle what there was of the American
welfare state. The financial reorganization of firms during the 1980s resulted in mergers,
plant closings, downsizings, and more concern with short term profits. This
3transformation has been described as the emergence of the "shareholder value"
conception of the firm (Davis and Thompson, 1994; Fligstein, 1996; for a polemical
statement, see Jensen, 1989). The result of public policy favoring only shareholders has
been less worker protection, slower wage growth, and more income inequality.
The "shareholder value" perspective on international competition, which is often
called the Anglo-American view, (Gourevitch, 1996) is now being touted as the solution
to all competitive problems in advanced industrial societies. The general rhetoric of
globalization and the policy implications of the American perspective have become part
of the worldwide pistemic community of economists as reflected in the policies of the
World Bank and the OECD (see for example, OECD, 1994). The argument is that the
appropriate response to the global economy is for governments to relax rules that
protect workers, allow more inequality by lowering tax rates on high income earners,
and promote the "shareholder value" conception by giving firms flexibility to invest and
disinvest how they choose. The only virtuous thing governments can do is to fund more
education to aid workers in adjusting to the new economy (Reich, 1992).
I show that the theoretical and empirical literatures concerning the causes of
economic growth, the nature of how firms come to be dominant in markets, and the role
of governments in economic development do not neatly fit these policy
recommendations. Labor costs are only one factor in competitive processes and for
industrial countries, one of the least important. Indeed, the business literature shows that
competitive advantage in a particular market depends on firms discovering novel forms
of social organization that take advantage of technology. Moreover, governments do far
more than just provide education for their citizens and they play crucial roles in their
economies.
The Anglo-American model and its globalization rhetoric has found its way into
political debate around western Europe where there is a fiscal crisis of the welfare state.
4Europe's problems are not caused by trade and competitiveness as they are typically
used. Indeed, European economies are amongst the most open in the world and the most
trade dependent. Over the past 15 years, their share of world trade has increased and
they in general, have run trade surpluses (as opposed to the supposedly more
competitive U.S. where trade deficits have been averaging 3% of GDP persistently over
the same period of time). Instead, European slow economic growth is caused by the
trend away from manufacturing towards services, the difficulty of starting new
businesses in Europe, the forthcoming monetary union, German unification, and the
increased demands for government services by an increasingly elderly population. The
theoretical and empirical literatures on gaining competitive advantage in markets show
that adopting the American shareholder value approach, dismantling social safety nets,
or changing work rules to strip workers of rights are not the obvious solutions to these
problems. Making it easier for firms to make investments and grow can be done without
making workers more insecure.
I conclude by considering how social scientists interested in social justice issues
can engage in both empirical and normative analyses that produce a counter discourse to
the one generated by economics and its major opponent, Marxism (or what's left of it).
The empirical literature shows that capitalism remains rooted in nations, even in markets
where there are global participants. National economic and political elites have
constructed extensive social organization that is the basis of their governments and
economies. Capitalist firms remain dependent on national governments and local labor
forces to provide them with stable political conditions, infrastructure, trade protection,
trade agreements, competition policies, privileged access to capital markets, and
bailouts. Because of this interdependence, societies have the continued right to make
claims on firms (see Dore, 1996, for a similar argument). This is a normative argument
5against the view of the shareholder conception of the firm that fails to embed
corporations appropriately in their societies.
What is globalization?
Economic globalization generally refers to three processes. First, there has been
an increase in the amount of world trade such that firms do not just compete in their own
economy, but against firms from economies around the world. Most proponents of the
globalization thesis argue that this has produced a qualitative change in competition.
This change is defined in a number of ways. The use of information technology is
thought to be the driving force that pushes forward globaliz tion (Castells, 1996). Firms
in this "new information society" have to move faster to respond to changes brought on
by information technology. They rely more on networks (defined to include industrial
districts (Piore and Sabel, 1984), long supply chains, joint ventures, and complex
ownership structures) to coordinate production processes on a world wide basis. Some
firms have gone so far as to contract out almost all of their productive activities to
markets and function mainly to design products and market them.
These "network" activities have a more negative side from the perspective of
citizens in developed societies. Firms are using information technologies to distribute
their productive activities to wherever in the world factors prices are low (Castells,
1996). First world jobs can be transferred to third world countries because factories can
be controlled, skills can be transferred, and wages are sufficiently low that they make up
for any additional transactions costs and lower productivity that might exist (Shaiken,
1990). This produces d industrialization (ie. the hollowing out of manufacturing by the
6closing of plants) such that high wage blue collar jobs are disappearing (Bluestone and
Harrison, 1984).
Since these workers often have few skills, they have a hard time finding new jobs.
A larger pool of unskilled labor also creates the condition of further depressing wages
for low skill jobs. The new jobs being created by the global economy are for people with
a high level of skill, what Robert Reich has called "knowledge workers" (1992). These
workers get paid more because they have the ideas and skills that make economic
integration possible. Since their productivity is high, their pay is going up. Taken
together, these two forces produce a perverse set of outcomes. Returns to human capital
are increasing for those at the top of the skill distribution while they are decreasing for
those at the bottom. This creates more societal income and wage inequality.
The second meaning of lobalization is that the rise of the so-called Asian tigers
has come at the expense of first world jobs in Europe and North America. U.S.,
Japanese, and to a lesser degree, European firms have transferred productive activities to
Asia's inexpensive, but relatively highly skilled abor forces. These societies ep tomize
the "information revolution". They are the production workers of the new technologies
and replace the higher priced labor of the industrialized world. The fast growth of these
economies is attributed to a number of factors: state led development processes that
produced infrastructure, ease of investment, high investment in human capital, and
political stability and openness to foreign capital (Wade, 1990; Akruz and Gore, 1996;
Campos and Root, 1996; Evans, 1995; World Bank, 1993).
The final meaning of gl balization is that the world financial markets for debt,
equity, and particularly currency, have grown substantially. Analysts critical of these
markets (Harvey, 1995; Castells, 1996: 435-6; Strange, 1986) see the huge amount of
currency being traded daily as a sign the central banks cannot control currency flows.
Moreover, speculators in these markets can cause runs on currencies of a given country
7if they perceive that the current economic policies are likely to result in high inflation or
high interest rates. World debt markets also limit fiscal policy options by pricing credit at
a high level. Together, world financial markets operate to force governments to pursue
monetary and fiscal policies that promote low inflation, slow economic growth, and curb
deficit spending.
These forces are thought to be causing fiscal crises for welfare states. The
demand for government services increases because of laid off workers and their families
and the increased wage pressure on low income families. Governments try to care for
these workers and have to run expansionary fiscal policies. Unfortunately, if they do so,
they face a number of problems. Governments have difficulty raising taxes in general and
cannot raise taxes on corporations because that will only encourage firms to move
offshore.  This accelerates the impact of globalization on deindustrialization by
discouraging capital formation. Governments have to be careful about running large
budget deficits because over time, world currency markets will force down the value of
their currency. This will increase the costs of financing deficits by world debt markets
who will demand higher interest rates. High interest rates will translate into slower
economic activity.
Governments are therefore trapped by not being able to respond to gl balization
which produces deindustrialization and more inequality.  Virtuous governments can only
run economic policies that promote low inflation, low tariff barriers, and cut back on
protection for workers and their families in the hopes of attracting foreign investment to
stimulate economic growth. The only positive thing governments can do is invest in
education.
8Critique of Globalization Arguments
This basic story is shared by both the economics profession and their principle
opposition, scholars who share more Marxist premises. For the economists, this analysis
of global trade and its effects on economic growth is a good thing because it will
eventually result in more wealth even if it produces short run problems of increased
inequality (Stopford and Strange, 1991; Petrella, 1996). For the Marxists, it is a bad
thing because people are losing more and more control over their lives and this is thus, a
new phase of capitalism that is even more virulent than the las (Arrighi, 1998). Both
economics and Marxism want to have economic forces be structural, inevitable, and
everywhere dominating action.
Readers familiar with these arguments will think that they have been proved
beyond a shadow of a doubt and that my scepticism must be based on no more than
fancy. But I want to suggest that the evidence is more ambiguous and we should be
sceptical of globalization claims for logical, theoretical, and empirical reasons. My
logical argument is that it is a strong claim to assert that any one structural shift is
causing everything we observe. Given what we know about how most social proces e
work, they usually reflect complex causes working together in different ways across time
and space. It should take a lot of evidence to convince us that the globaliz tion story is
true. From a logical point of view, at the very least, one would expect that societies that
were more susceptible to the negative effects of world trade ought to be experiencing
the downsides  more intensely than societies that were experiencing them less intensely.
So, for example, European societies should be more susceptible to these changes than
American or Japanese society. It is useful to consider the evidence more closely.
9The Slow Expansion and Unevenness of Global Trade
It is well known that world trade has been increasing in the post World War II
era. Most scholars know that world trade has increased almost 1200% since 1950 while
world GDP has increased 600% (OECD, 1997). During the 1990s, it appeared as if
world trade was growing at an alarming rate. So, for instance, in 1994, world trade grew
by almost 14% and in 1995, grew by an astounding 20% (OECD, 1996). But these
numbers are misleading in two ways. First, world trade (about $5.1 trillion in 1995) as a
percentage of world economic activity (about $33.5 trillion in 1995) at the end of 1995
stood at about 14.7%. This means that still over 85% of the world economy was not
involved in trade (Wade, 1996). While trade was growing fast in the mid 1990s, it has
hardly overwhelmed the world economy.
Second, this trend towards more world trade should be considered from a longr
historical perspective. Numerous scholars have noted that the previous peak for world
trade as a percentage of world economic activity in this century occurred in 1913 when
world trade stood at about 14% of world GDP (Bairoch, 1993; Bairoch and Kozul-
Wright, 1996; Kenwood and Loughheed, 1994). The two World Wars and the
Depression so greatly disrupted world trade that in 1953, world trade stood at only 6%
of world GDP, only 1/3 of its previous high level from 1914. These events meant that it
took almost 70 years to return that trade to its pre- World War I level.
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Figure 1: World trade as a percent of world GDP, 1953-1995 
(Sources: See Appendix A)
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Figure 1 presents evidence on the patterns of world trade since 1953 as
percentage of world GDP. From 1953 until 1969, world trade grew gradually as a
percentage of world economic activity from 6% to about 9%. Between 1969 and 1981,
world trade grew dramatically and peaked in 1981 at about 16% of world GDP. Trade
as a percentage of w rld GDP subsequently dropped to about 11% in 1991. From there
it increased in a short period of time (5 years) to about 15% of world GDP. What this
table shows is that over the postwar era, trade has generally been increasing faster than
world GDP. But it has done so in starts and stops and during the decade of the 1980s, it
actually grew more slowly than world economic activity. Trade began to grow
dramatically in the 1990s, but has slowed in the late 1990s (World Trade Organization,
1997: 3). World trade has increased, but in the context of long-term world economic
growth, and in the context of the size and growth of the world economy, it is not at
levels that suggest national economies are being overwhelmed (for more on the long
view, see Kenwood and Loughheed, 1994). Indeed, if one looks at the world's
experience in the postwar era, it is obvious that from the long run perspective the events
of the 1990s are nowhere as dramatic as the events of the 1969-81 period.
Another claim of globalization theorists, is that the direction of trade between the
first and developing worlds has changed. The claim is that it used to be that developed
countries' trade with developing countries' was for commodities and not finished
manufacturing goods, while trade between advanced industrial societies was primarily in
finished goods. Now, globalization means that third world countries are engaging in first
world manufacturing. Moreover, the less developed societies are supposedly increasing
their share of world exports and manufacturing. Bairoch (1996) summarizes a great deal
of this evidence for the long run. He concludes that most world trade has been between
developed countries and that this has changed little (it was about 65% in 1913) in the
past 90 years.
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Figure 2: Percent of trade by developed countries (Pertrade), 
percent of trade by developed countries with other developed 
countries (indind), and percent of manu. exports by developed 
countries (Sources: See Appendix A)
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      Figure 2 presents evidence for the period since 1953. This graph shows more
continuity and less change in the relative shares of world trade than the globalization
argument implies. The developed world's percentage of trade increased, not decreased
during the 1950s and 1960s. During the oil crisis of the 1970s, the share of trade of the
developed world dropped to 64%. During the 1980s, however, the share of trade in the
developed world increased and peaked at 72% in 1991. While the trade share of
developed societies has gone up and down (it currently stands at almost 67%), it has not
trended downward over time, but instead has moved within a relatively narrow range
(between 60 and 70%). Figure 2 also shows that developed countries are trading more
with one another over time. Industrialized societies do over 70% of their trade with each
other and this has trended upward over time. Finally, figure 3 shows the share of exports
that are manufactured goods that originate in developed societies over time. One can
observe that the developed world's share of manufacturing increased from 1953 until the
early 1970s, stayed constant until 1985, and rose substantially and declined slightly. The
overall trend, however, is upward.
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Table 1: Percentage of world merchandise exports by region, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995
1980     1985     1990     1995
North America
 Exports          14.4     16.0     15.4     15.9
 Imports          15.5     21.7     18.4     18.7
Latin America
 (with Mexico)
 Exports           5.4      5.6      4.3      4.6
 Imports           5.9      4.2      3.6      4.9
Western Europe
 Exports          40.2     40.1     48.3     44.8
 Imports          44.8     39.6     44.7     43.5
Eastern Europe
 (with C.I.S)
 Exports           7.8      8.1      3.1      .
 Imports           7.5      7.4      3.3      2.9
Africa
 Exports           5.9      4.2      3.0      2.1
 Imports           4.7      3.5      2.7      2.4
Middle East
 Exports          10.6      5.3      4.0      2.9
 Imports           5.0      4.5      2.8      2.6
Japan
 Exports           6.4      9.1      8.5      9.1
 Imports           6.8      6.5      6.8      6.7
Asia
 Exports           9.2     11.7     13.3     17.5
 Imports           9.9     12.3     14.5     18.3
Source: World Trade Association Annual Report, 1995, table III.1, III.2
This suprising patterns fly in the face of our knowledge that there has been huge
increases in trade with Asia. Table 1 presents results on the shares of world imports and
exports in the regions of the world. There has been a great deal of stability in the shares
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of world trade for North America, Europe, Latin America, and Japan. Africa, the Middle
East, Eastern Europe, and the countries of the former Soviet Union have all seen
decreases in their shares. The greatest increase has been in Asia. While this evidence
corroborates the view that the Asian societies have seen a great increase in their exports,
the share of trade going to developed countries (North America, Europe and Japan) has
not decreased as a result of the growth. Instead, it is the share of the rest of the
developing economies that has decreased. Table 1 also presents information about
imports. While Asian societies have seen a great increase in exports, their imports
exceed their exports. This reflects their importation of raw materials and equipment to
produce economic growth. The EU and Japan have been running trade surpluses
suggesting that their goods are competitive in the world. The U.S. has run a persistent
and large trade deficit. While U.S. exports have grown substantially, U.S. imports have
risen as dramatically.
Table 2 examines the structure of world trade by looking at the origin and
destination of trade in 1993. This table shows that the largest trading partner for western
European societies is we tern Europe. It also demonstrates that 46.5% of exports from
Asian societies end up in Asia. North America (here defined as the U.S. and Canada) has
the most diversified trade profile. Their exports are predominantly to one another with
the rest almost evenly divided between Asia, Europe, and the rest of the world.
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Table 2: Regional structure of world merchandise trade in exports, 1993; percentage of
regional exports shipped to each region
                            Destination of Trade
North Western Asia Rest of Total
America Europe World
Origins of
Trade
North America 35.6 20.2 25.0 19.2 100.0
Western Europe8.0 68.9 8.8 14.3 100.0
Asia 26.4 17.6 46.5 14.2 100.0
Source: World Trade Organization Annual Report (1996), table II.1
The picture that emerges from these tables is a world where trade is increasing in
absolute terms (from almost $2 trillion to $5 trillion in 15 years), but not dramatically in
relative terms (from 12% to 15% of world GDP). The direction of trade remains
predominantly from developed to d vel ped societies and these societies have increased
their share of manufactured goods. While Asia has grown in exports, it has not taken
trade shares away from the developed world. The societies that have not gained as much
in trade have been the rest of the developing world. In sum, increases in trade have been
gradual and there is no evidence that the develop d world has lost out.
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Table 3: Network of exports by region and product, 1993
                               Destinations
Total EU North Asia Rest of World
in Billion $ America
Origin
World                3641.0        42.7      19.4          22.8           15.1
Agriculture        437.8         47.7      11.9           23.4          17.0
                          (12.0)
Mining               433.0         40.1      18.1          30.2           11.6
                          (11.9)
Manufacturing  2288.9       43.9      20.0          20.7           15.3
                          (62.8)
Office and          379.4         36.4      27.3          27.8            8.5
Telecom Equip. (10.4)
(EU)
Agriculture       196.7           76.7      4.2            5.0            14.1
Mining              110.6           78.4      8.4            4.0             9.2
Manufacturing 1162.7         67.1      8.7            9.9            14.3
Office and         102.1           71.4      9.8            9.3             9.5
Telecom. Equip.
(North America)
Agriculture       85.6             16.2      25.6         37.7          20.5
Mining             43.2             15.0      51.6         21.9          11.5
Manufacturing 371.3           19.0      43.4         21.0          16.3
Office and         71.2             27.2      23.6         35.8          13.1
Telecom. Equip.
(Asia)
Agriculture       83.5             15.6      11.6         61.0          21.8
Mining              69.8             6.7         4.6          83.2           5.5
Manufacturing 589.1           18.0      28.0         44.1           9.9
Office and        193.1            21.6      37.0         36.0           5.4
Telecom. Equip.
% of World Exports
Agriculture                           44.9      19.5         19.1         16.5
Mining                                  25.5       9.9          16.1         49.5
Manufacturing                     50.8      16.2         25.9          7.1
Office and                             26.7      19.3         50.8          3.2
Telecom. Equip.
Source: World Trade Organization Annual Report, Table A.7
18
These patterns deserve to be examined more closely by disaggregating trade by
products and regions. Table 3 presents evidence relevant to globalization arguments. It
has been argued that one of the sectors where the forces of globalization are most
prevalent is information technology and telecommunication equipment. Table 3 shows
that this sector produced $379.4 billion in trade in 1993, a sizeable number. But, it for
only about 10% of world exports (nearly $4 trillion in that year) and about 1.5% of
world GDP. The largest trade volumes continue to be for commodities like grain, oil,
other raw materials, and metals, chemicals, and more traditional manufactured industrial
goods like machines, electrical equipment, and automobile and other transportation
equipment.
The bottom of the table presents data on the shares of each of the regions'
production of exports by industrial sector. The European Union (EU) ships most of its
production within its confines.  This has increased over time (OECD, 1996). Trade
between the U.S. and Canada is mainly for mining products and manufactured goods.
The bulk of exports outside of North America end up in Asia where the U.S. and Canada
ship large amounts of office and telecommunication equipment. A surprising amount of
Asian exports end up in Asia, particularly for agricultural, mining, and manufactured
products. Asian exports a lot of office and telecommunications equipment to the rest of
the world. Much of this ends up in the U.S.
The last part of table 3 presents the relative shares of world exports by sectors.
The EU produces about 44% of world trade. It is ov rrepresented in manufactured
goods and underrepresented in mining and office and telecommunications equipment.
North America produces about 17% of exports and is underrepresented in mining and
overrepresented in agricultural and computer goods. Most of its goods end up in North
America, followed by Asia. Asia accounts for about 27% of world trade and is
underrepresented in every category but office and telecommunication equipment. The
19
rest of the world, mostly developing countries is ove represented in mining and
agriculture; ie. raw material production.
This table gives insight into what is true and what is not true about the
globalization story. Asian societies have rapidly increased their exports and these are
disproportionately for office and telecommunications equipment, as the globalization
argument suggests. This fuels the belief that high technology manufacturing has fled to
Asia. But, while the dollar amounts of these exports are large ($193.1 billion in 1993),
relative to world trade, these amounts are not as significant (about 5%). Asian
manufacturing outside of this sector is below their share of xports which implies that
the advantage in office and telecommunications equipment has not spr ad overall to
manufacturing.
Table 4: Exports as a percentage of GNP for selected advanced industrial countries,
1970, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995
Country                   1970    1980    1985    1990     1995
United States            4.2       7.9      5.1       6.7        8.0
Germany               18.5     23.6     29.4     25.9      21.0
Japan                        9.5      12.2    13.1      9.8        8.6
France                     12.4     16.7     18.5     17.5     18.5
Italy                        12.3     17.4     18.5     15.5     21.2
United Kingdom     15.5     21.2     21.9     18.8     21.8
Canada                    19.0     23.8     24.5     20.8     33.5
OECD Average       17.7     22.8     26.0     23.3     23.1
Source: Foreign Trade by Commodities, OECD (Paris, 1994), table 4.1. Economic Survey, OECD
(Paris, 1996)
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Societies where trade dependence is low are by definition less at risk from
external trade and should be less open to its negative and positive effects. Table 4
presents exports as a percentage of GDP from 1970 to 1995 for the core OECD
countries. The U.S. economy has about 8% of its economy involved in exports, up from
about 4% in 1970 (OECD, 1996). This is a significant increase that come about slowly.
Japan's exports as a percentage of GDP have actually decreased in the past 10 years.
German exports total 21% of GDP in 1995. In general, the Europeans are the most trade
dependent and the U.S. and Japan the least. This implies that if increasing world trade
volumes are producing pressures for changes, Europe should be most hard hit. It turns
out, of course, that the opposite has occurred. Higher levels of pay for more skilled
workers and increasing income inequality, increased most in the U.S. and hardly changed
at all in Europe. This is an issue to which I shall return.
There is a tendency to have a mercantilist view of trade; ie.tha  it is a zero sum
game whereby if one society gains another uses. The argument is often advanced by
some scholars that societies develop competitive advantages that spread across their
industries and produce national models (see for example, the volume by Crouch and
Streeck, 1997). This, of course, is economically problematic. Societies do not compete,
firms do. There are going to be winning and losing firms in every society in each market.
Economic growth in a particular society depends upon summing the experience of firms
across markets. This will depend on which markets are growing (ie. finding customers
for their products), which ones are not, and how much national firms are winning and
losing in that market (Krugman, 1995 a; b). The exposure trade works in the same way.
Firms that are successful in trade (after all, trade is just participation in markets across
national borders) help produce economic growth and new jobs in their country. Firms
that are less successful may go out of business. The total effect of trade on national
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economic growth will depend on the net balance of winning and losing firms, and of
course, the size of trade.
Globalization can only be a force for economic and political change to the degree
that it effects different sectors of a given society consistently in a negative way. So, some
societies may be more vulnerable than others depending on the level of their trade
dependency and the overall success or failure of their products. The evidence implies
that advanced industrial societies continue to dominate world trade and compete more
with one another than with developing societies.
Change or Continuity in the Organization of Production?
One of the central claims of globalization theorists, is that in the past 15 years,
trade has changed not just quantitatively, but qualitatively. So, we are now in the world
of the information society where information technology is driving world trade. The
evidence that information technology has qualitatively changed the way capitalist firms
operate in the world economy and hence, global competition more generally, is difficult
to assemble. Manuel Castells (1996) has recently tried to do so. Even Castells is led to
admit that firms across the world have organized themselves in very different ways
(1996: chapter 3). His evidence shows that Asian firms in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are
organized differently from one another and from the U.S. and European firms (1996:
190). This conclusion is supported by the wider scholarship about not just Asian firms
but European firms as well (Fligstein and Freeland, 1995; Hamilton and Biggart, 1988;
Wade, 1996; Pauly and Reich, 1997; see the edited books by Whitley, 1992; Crouch and
Streeck, 1997; Berger and Dore, 1996; Boyer and Drache, 1996). Nonetheless, he wants
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to claim that all of these differences are subsumable under the rubric of
"informationalism".
This debate over the spread of "informalionalism" or as it is sometimes
construed, "networks", has both theoretical and empirical problems. First, the features of
organizations that scholars focus on differ from study to study. Second, it is nearly
impossible to assess whether or not these features are decisive for organizational success
because success is rarely defined. Third, the data to evaluate multiple causes and effects
of success are hard to compile. Finally, the definition of this new global form is
notoriously slippery. "Informationalism" as an organizational model for Castells includes
business networks of suppliers and customers, the use of information technology to
redistribute the economic activities of firms, global competition, the state's participation
in promoting high technology, and the emergence and consolidation of the network
enterprise (1996: 196-7). One can see that even if one is sympathetic to his argument, it
is not clear that these are all one phenomena and it is not clear that they define
something new that is transformative.
It is the case that all of these factors have been part of the world economy for the
past 100 years with the exception of the recent advances in information technology.
There have been global supply networks, global competition between firms, the use of
new transportation and communication technologies to engage in more trade, and
governments playing a large number of roles in facilitating trade. The idea that firms only
recently discovered the phenomena of outsourcing or depending on supply chains flies in
the face of business history which can track these phenomena to before World War I
(Chandler, 1990).
The largest firms in the world economy have organiz d themselves on a
worldwide scale for at least the past 100 years (Wilkins, 1970; 1974; Vernon, 1970;
Chandler, 1990; Dunning, 1984; see Wade (1996) who reviews literature asserting the
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dominance of multinationals since early in the century). To current glob logists, it may
come as a surprise that the worldwide organization of production by multinationals has
been a phenomena that existed before World War II (Stopford and Wells, 1972) and
arguably from much earlier (Dunning, 1984; Wilkins, 1970; 74). By 1919, over 90% of
the 100 largest American firms were already doing substantial business overseas
(Fligstein, 1990). Stopford and Wells (1972) examine how a sample of multinational
firms reorganized themselves in a step by step fashion to coordina e production on a
world scale during the 1950s and 1960s. Raymond Vernon (1970) and Charles
Kindleberger (1969), in the same era, thought that transnational firms had become such a
world power that they were not attached to any society. Japanese business networks pre-
date the Second World War and Korean networks were modelled on Japanese
organization (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988).
The "informationalism" argument assumes technology is driving social change.
One could easily make technology the dependent variable given what I have already
noted about the activities of large multinational corporations (B enner (1998) makes this
case as well). The demand for computer equipment, telecommunications, and new and
faster forms of transportation since World War II came about precisely because large
corporations were trying to take advantage of business opportunities and control their
far flung activities. Computer companies, and later computer chip and software
producers, have a huge incentive to build bigger and more powerful machines. At the
very least, a believer in the transformed world economy would want to argue that the
desire to coordinate more effectively on a world scale stimulated the production of these
technologies and that helped increase world wide production (Krugman, 1995a).
There is no systematic evidence to show that "inform ionalism" has produced a
qualitative change in firm organization even for multinationals. There is also no data to
suggest that network organizations, defined as firms that contract out most of their
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activities, have substantially reorganized the population of multinationals. Firms have
reorganized their production to take advantage of the opening of national markets of
affluent customers, but they use most of the local production for local consumption. It is
not clear what implications this network form and "informationalism" in general have for
the 85% of the world economy not involved in trade. It is not surprising that scholars
who study organization structures across societies conclude that there are myriad forms
that operate with surprisingly different logics, even in the same industries.
Does Globalization cause deindustrialization and
inequality?
So far, I have painted a picture of globalization as being more gradual over time,
less revolutionary in its impacts on economies and firms, and more uneven in its
economic effects on the organization of firms and societies. This more complex picture
should at least caution us, to want to connect the growth of world trade more closely to
its alleged negative effects, deindustrialization, the transfer of jobs from first to third
world economies, and increases in wage and income inequality. The empirical literature
supports the view that trade is not the main cause of deind trialization and increases in
wage inequality in the U.S. Moreover, these changes have not occurred in the much
more trade dependent societies of western Europe. Instead, one can interpret all of the
political and economic changes that have occurred in the U.S. in the past 15 years as
having favored capital and hurt labor (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1995), while European
governments have continued to support public policies that maintain more equality.
It is generally accepted amongst economists, that only about 10% of the loss of
manufacturing jobs in the U.S. is directly traceable to plant relocation in other countries
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(Krugman, 1994; 1995a; b; Bluestone, 1994; Gottschalk and Joyce, 1994; and the
papers in Danziger and Gottschalk, 1995). Most observers agree that at least half of
these jobs were lost to OECD countries and not the Third World (Krugman, 1995 a; b).
Deindustrialization has a well known cause: improvements in technological processes
(Krugman, 1994; 1995b). People have been replaced by new and more efficient
technologies that increase the productivity of the remaining workers and eliminate the
jobs of others. Even radical economists in the U.S., like Blueston and Harrison (1982),
believe that most deindustrialization reflected changes in technology.
Increases in inequality in advanced industrial societies have almost nothing to do
with trade and almost everything to do with politics and the organized relationship
between labor and capital. The societies with the highest trade dependence in 1980 were
in Europe and the one with the lowest, the U.S. At the time, both wage and income
inequality in America were higher by a substantial margin (Gottschalk and Smeeding,
1995; Smeeding, et. al., 1990). The two countries that have experienced the greatest
increases in income inequality in the OECD in the past 15 years have been the U.S. and
Britain (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1995). The more trade dependent societies of
Germany, France and the rest of western European actually experienced declines in
income inequality during the 1980s and some small increases during the 1990s. The
increases were small in magnitude, given that European incomes were much more equal
to begin with, and the observed changes were much smaller in percentage terms than the
U.S. (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1995).
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Figure 3: Changes in the Ratio of Earnings between skilled and 
unskilled workers, 1985=100 (Source: OECD, 1996) 
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If trade was driving wage inequality, one would expect that wage differences
between skilled and unskilled workers across western Europe would have increased like
in the U.S.. But this has not happened. Figure 3 shows this dramatically. In the U.S.
wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers have increased by over 30% in
the past 15 years. In England, this gap has increased about 10%. In France, we see
almost no change in the ratio of wage differences between skilled and unskilled labor.
The data on returns to schooling are more sketchy in Europe, but do not reveal dramatic
patterns showing that higher educated people are able to cash in at much higher rates
(see the papers in Smeeding et. al,, 1990). Indeed, in some European societies like
Sweden, people with college degrees do not earn much more than those with high
school diplomas (Smeeding et. al, 1990).
The careful studies in Danziger and Gottschalk conclude that the more
sociological factors driving the reorganization of work in the U.S.  explain most of the
sources of the increase in income inequality. The increases in downsizing, the decline of
unions, and increase in part-time workers has made for more income distribution and the
growing insecurity of workers. Changes in tax laws have favored more well off people
and these have played some part as well. Bluestone (1994) tries to partition the effect of
all of these factors and concludes that 90% of the change in income inequality in the
U.S. is not trade related. Danziger and Gottschalk conclude that all of the changes in the
U.S. economy in the past 15 years worked to the advantage of capital and against labor.
The picture that emerges her , is the exceptionalism of the U.S. Technological
change has effected Europe as well. But, because of the very different ways in which
governments have acted to redistribute income and protect laid off workers, and the
relative strength of unions to protect workers in labor negociations, income inequality
has not risen. The OECD recently completed a large study of jobs in the developed
economy (1994). As a result of the changes described above in the U.S., earnings of full
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time workers declined 3.1% from 1985 until 1993. In Italy, they rose 10.4%, in Germany
21.0%, in France, 7.2%, and in Sweden 9.3%. This shows starkly that the "lean and
mean" competitive posturing of U.S. business is almost entirely due to the drop in real
wages for all workers. This drop reflects how American firms have reorganized and
squeezed workers.
I think I have provided a quick, but sufficient review to make the reader sceptical
of globalization arguments. There is enough prima facie evidence to suggest that world
trade, while growing, is not dominating the advanced industrial economies to the extent
people claim. Firms across societies and industries have been org nized globally for most
of the postwar era, and while information technologies are useful in that endeavor, the
continued expansion of multinational corporations has more to do with the growth of
markets than technology.
Trade also does not appear to be driving deindustrialization or increases in wage
and income inequality per se. Deindustrialization is driven primarily by technological
change. Cross national data on income inequality shows there have been few changes in
the societies where trade is greatest, those in western Europe, while the greatest changes
have taken place in the least trade reliant society, the U.S. This suggests that the truth in
the globalization story has more to do with what is going on in America than in Europe.
America has seen a rapid increase in trade, particularly in the 1990s. This has been
accompanied by a rapid increase in inequality exacerbated by political trends which have
favored capital over labor by making workers absorb most of the costs of downsizing
and new technology. It is this set of ideas, that capital has to increase its returns, and has
to be able to do so in any way possible, that is at the root of the globalization discussion.
It is not trade per se that is driving this discussion, but the reorganization of firms and
work in the American context along lines favoring capital alone. America, the advanced
industrial society least dependent on trade, is ironically, the one exporting the idea that in
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the "new world competition", the only acceptable strategy is to lower the cost of labor
and enrich capital.
Politics, Governments, and Financial Markets
One of the great misunderstandings amongst noneconomist scholars about
financial markets is the idea that financial markets are a single market. The markets for
currency, corporate equity, corporate debt, retail banking, government debt, insurance
for corporations and individuals, individual debt, and debt for home ownership are
markets separated by firms and nations. As Wade (1996) points out, there is very little
integration in any world financial markets except for currency, government bonds, and
some futures markets for commodities. There is no world market for equities nor any
world market for corporate control. Most investment and savings are made within
nations. Less than 10% of the capital stock in OECD countries is owned by citizens of
other countries (Kapstein, 1994). In the U.S., Germany, and Japan (the three largest
economies in the world), less than 5% of the workers are employed by foreign capital
(Wade, 1996).
The relationship between world currency and government debt markets have
been part of the long history of capitalism since the 17th century (Carruthers, 1997).
Governments have helped create financial markets to benefit themselves and to help
capitalists. Governments are responsible for producing the world currency markets, as
they moved from fixed exchange rates to market determined rates since the 1960s (Dean
and Pringle, 1995; Kapstein, 1994). After World War II, governments attempted to
control exchange rates by fixing them and guaranteeing to back them up through the sale
of gold. As world trade increased in the postwar era, governments found it more difficult
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to control exchange rates. Currency markets came into existence to determine the
relative price of currencies based on the supply of and demand for any given currency.
The creation of these markets could be taken as a failure of sovereign states to control
the value of their money. But, currency markets serve useful functions for governments
and firms (Houthakker and Williamson, 1996). One major function is to allow
multinational firms to hedge their risks. Firms buy futures contracts on a given set of
currencies and place bets on both sides: ie. that the price of two currencies will both go
up and go down.
It has been frequently noted that huge amounts of money change hands in these
markets daily and this is the source of power for these markets. What is not well
understood, is that this process can stabilize currency relationships in the short run. Most
of the traders who move money try to take advantage of small differences in currency
prices across markets located around the world. So, if dollars can be bought for 1.50
marks in one place and 1.51 marks in another, money can be made by buying lower and
selling higher. These opportunities usually appear fleetingly because many traders leap
in, and the differences disappear quickly stabilizing the price of currencies (Houthakker
and Williamson, 1996). Changes in the relative value of currencies tends to be gradual
which helps trade and governments. Governments can then attempt to keep their
currencies in a band by buying and selling into the market.
Central banks in the past 20 years, have generally shifted their role from
managing the business cycle through the control of money supply and interest rates to
trying to promote price stability (Dean and Pri gle, 1995; Kapstein, 1994). One
argument that is sometimes made is that this is proof that currency markets rule because
exchange rates will quickly reflect the inflation expectations of currency traders and limit
bankers to focusing on inflation.
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The problem with this argument is that it gets the story backwards. As a result of
the oil shocks of the 1970s, there was low economic growth and high inflation across
many OECD countries. To tame this inflation, many of the central bankers, notably Paul
Volcker in the U.S., forced interest rates higher and produced a deep recession. Since
then, central bankers have more consistently attempted to insure price stability as they
were convinced that monetary policies that stimulated money supply or loan growth led
to uncontrollable domestic price inflation. Currency traders come to recognize the
potential for bad economic outcomes and tend to sell currencies where governments
might be acting in an inflationary manner.
There are two other downsides to these markets. First, many market participants
are not using the markets to hedge currency fluctuations, but instead to make bets for or
against a given currency. This means that no useful economic function is being served
and produces what Strange (1986) has called "casino capitalism". Second, if traders
think that a given currency is suddenly in trouble, they can punish the holders of that
currency. Markets tend to overshoot the real exchange rate by over or undervaluing a
given currency. Currency traders can also attack currencies where the underlying
financial fundamentals are sound as happened after the Mexican debt crisis in 1994 to
other countries in Latin America and the crises in Asia in 1997-8. These more social
processes are what gives rise to fears about how currency markets can effect national
interest rates and hence monetary policy.
This, unfortunately, is an area where there is a great deal of controversy, and a
lack of research. There are almost no sociological studies of these type market
contagion processes in the context of the world financial markets. It is clear that the
people who trade currencies use very similar information. In the face of uncertainty, a
given rational actor might edge out of a particular currency. While this is rational for that
trader, collectively, it can produce a cascade that results in a massive selling of a
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particular country's currency, even though the financial situation does not merit it. It is
clear that for developing countries, these types of attacks can have had devastating
effects. Where large currency fluctuations occur for little reason, one can see that global
financial integration has not been altogether positive.
The problem is that in many of these situations, governments play a complex role
in these processes. Many of the recent crises are the result of intended or unintended
government policy which was framed around the politics of domestic constituencies.
While currency markets may have punished currencies, it was usually after long time lags
and extensive policy errors.
A good case in point is the Mexican situation where a recent dissertation argued
that domestic politics was behind all of the changes in financial policy in the past 20
years (Kessler, 1997). The peso devaluation in 1994 is often viewed as a causal outcome
of the financial markets, but the events implicate governments and politics in a more
ambiguous way (McKinnon, 1996). At least two years before the devaluation, it was
well known that the Mexican currency was overvalued (McKinnon, 1996). Six months
before the devaluation, one estimate was that the currency was overvalued by at least
25% and maybe as much as 50%.The Mexican government, with the consent and
approval of the American government, tried to prop the peso up. Why? Because there
was about to be an election, and the leaders of the PRI, who had prided t emselves on
professional handling of the economy, did not want negative news about the economy.
They kept the peso propped up by spending foreign reserves to buy pesos. People in the
financial community around the world knew this and given that the peso was being
supported by large reserves, traders did not sell pesos (McKinnon, 1996).
But during May 1994, the Mexican government stopped reporting its currency
reserves on a monthly basis. At first, they claimed that the reports were to be issued, but
that statistical errors and technical problems prevented them from doing so. By the fall
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of 1994, it was not clear how deep the government reserves were. About that time,
Mexican bankers began selling off pesos and peso denominated bonds in large quantities
(Kessler, 1997; McKinnon, 1996). They obviously had a better sense of where the
government stood and they sold out as quickly as they could. This, of course, put more
pressure on foreign reserves, and as time went on, it became clear that the government
could not prop the price of the peso up. They continued to refuse to issue reports
concerning their current account situation.
In December, after six months and continued heavy selling by Mexican banks, the
peso began to drop precipitously. The Mexican government reached the point where it
could no longer had current account reserves to support the peso. The U.S. bailout
served two purposes. First, it gave the Mexican government more reserves to stabilize
the currency. Second, it bailed out U.S. bondholders who were caught with peso
denominated bonds that now were worth less than 50% of their original value.
This case shows, that yes, world financial markets eventually punished the peso.
But it also shows the Mexican and American governments, for basically political reasons,
propped it up in the first place. Mexican bankers were saved while the Mexican people
were sacrificed (and of course, U.S. bondholders were bailed out) leading to speculation
that because of their close links to the government, they had privileged information
(McKinnon, 1996). This is a complex story that implicates markets, governments, and
economic elites. It also does not make international currency traders the obvious
scapegoats.
Markets for corporate equity and corporate and government debt serve useful
purposes. The growth of equity markets has increased the capital firms and their owners
can draw on, and the increased growth in corporate bond markets make it easier to
borrow money at lower interest rates to fund new investment (Houthakker and
Williamson, 1996). Debt markets for government bonds have also grown internationally.
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The size of these markets means that governments can borrow money for less interest
than they might otherwise. The OECD governments, particularly the U.S., have run
huge deficits throughout the past 15 years and these would have been more difficult to
fund without international markets.
Governments and firms have always needed to borrow money to fund their
activities. World financial markets have grown in size and complexity. But it is difficult
to ascertain if government dependence on these markets has increased to the point of
limiting fiscal and monetary policy. If governments want to borrow money, they can,
albeit they may have to pay higher interest rates. Moreover, there is reason to believe
that governments have benefited as much from these markets by being able to run
deficits and produce some exchange rate stability.
Trade, Competition, Industrial Policy, and the Welfare
State 
There is a tendency to view governments as helpless in the face of global
competition (Strange, 1996; Cerny, 1997; Frieden, 1991; Castells, 1996; Saskia-Sasson,
1996). In spite of a plethora of evidence that economies are mostly org nized with firms
remaining rooted to a particular system of national property rights and governance,
political scientists and sociologists seem convinced that the forces of globalization are
soon going to make states irrelevant to their political economies. Susan Strange (1994),
for example, argues that firms in globally integrated markets, simply bypass states in
their relentless search for lower cost production and new markets. Her argument implies
that governments are never as clever or effective as markets and therefore, they should
just retrench. The argument is also made that governments that try and intervene into
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competitive global capitalism are presented with a trade-off between efficiency (ie.
allowing capital to deploy itself in a way so as to maximize its opportunities in global
capitalist competition) and equity (ie. the use of various kinds of state sponsored devices
to protect workers from precisely this kind of flexibility). Essentially, governments are
being told by globologists that the "new global competition" leaves them very few policy
options. They must get smaller, remove fetters to the actions of capital, take rights away
from workers, or face the consequence that their best firms will either leave the country
and invest elsewhere, or fall hopelessly behind their competitors.
There are two problems with this argument. First, it assumes that labor co ts re
essentially the only variable driving international economic competition in markets where
firms from different societies meet. The argument is that the only way to compete for
good jobs with third world countries or the U.S. with its unfettered labor markets, is to
follow government policies that lower wages and lessen worker protection. One can
construct theoretical reasons to support such a policy, but there are good theoretical
arguments and more important, empirical evidence as to why this view is wrong.
The basic theoretical problem is that competitiveness in any given industry is a
mix of factors, some having to do with costs including labor costs, but the most
important ones having to do with the competencies of firms in organ zing production and
creating new technologies (Winter, 1987; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Porter, 1985; Womack,
et. al, 1990; Chandler, 1990). Since most of the real competition is between developed
countries where labor has a higher rate of productivity, competing on labor costs does
not make much sense.  For example, in the automobile industry, the rise of Japanese auto
makers had little to do with labor costs and a great deal to do with the distinctive way
they organized production (Womack, et. al., 1990). Japanese workers in these firms
enjoy high wages and job security which are supposed to be anathema to international
competition (Dore, 1987).
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Second, it assumes that all government policies have negative effects on
economic growth by consuming economic resources that would otherwise be put to
more productive uses by the private sector. This argument is wrong both theoretically
and empirically. Theoretically, the positive role of states in economics derives fr  the
problem of market failure in the context of the provision of public goods. The "new
institutional economics" suggests several mechanisms by which government spending
and policies might positively effect growth. Endogenous growth theory argues that
spending on education, health, and communications and transportation infrastructure are
thought to have positive effects on growth (Barro, 1990; Romer, 1990; Aschauer,
1991). North (1990) and Ma dison (1995) have suggested that states also provide
political stability, legal institutions, stable monetary systems, and reliable governments.
Without these social institutions, economic actors will refuse to make investments in
economies of scale and scope (for evidence on this point see the essays in the recent
volume edited by Chandler, Amatori, and Hikino, 1997). Some economists are prepared
to believe that different forms of industrial policies might be effective by providing
investment in research and development, capital for risky ventures, and military spending
(Tyson, 1992).  This laundry list shows that it is not so easy to discuss what is often
called the "efficiency-equity trade-off" in making economic policy.  At the very least, the
choice is not just for or against governments, but for or against policies that might help
economic growth (Evans, 1995).
 If this is the case, where does the negative view of states intervening into their
economies come from? There is a strand of thought in economics that assumes that
governments are rent seekers (Buchanan, Tollison, and Tulloch, 1990). This implies that
all of their activities are illegitimate in the sense that they will try and maximize their
share of national income and by doing so, will take resources away from the private
sector. But the idea that all states are predatory, is not just a product of social choice
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theory. It is related to the scholarly and policy interest in the past 15 years in trying to
assess how nations could attain competitive advantages for their firms in markets.
From the point of view of intellectual trends, many scholars became interested in
Japan and the "Asian miracle" in the 1980s (Johnson, 1982; D re, 1987; Hamilton and
Biggart, 1988). This caused them to try and decipher why Japan, Taiwan, and Korea
were able to develop so quickly and the role of governments were part of the focus of
attention. Others saw the German economy to be admired for its neocorp a ist political
system, formal cooperation between labor and capital, and its relatively small firms that
were oriented towards exporting high quality manufactured goods (Albert, 1991). Still
others viewed the future of manufacturing as being about flexible specialization, where
small firms in the industrial districts of Italy, Silicon Valley, or Bavaria existed (Piore and
Sabel, 1984). These highly networked firms could respond quickly to changes in market
demand. Various scholars became convinced that one of these models held the key to
industrial competitiveness amongst nations. States played an important part in most of
these stories. During the 1990s, the resurgence of the U.S. economy meant that it was
natural that the relative success of the American economy has propelled scholars to turn
back to the U.S. and extol the virtues of American style corporate governance and labor
relations as the key to economic success. Given the American view that states should
play a minimal role, it is not uprising that government intervention is now out of favor.
This is particularly true as the Asian and European models appear to be experiencing
some economic distress.
But, these fads in intellectual thought do not do justice to the difficulty of
unravelling what causes economic growth. They tend to overstate the significance of a
single cause as the way to attain competitive advantage and understate the fact that
multiple factors are at work. They are quick to assume that whatever factor is isolated is
the main mechanism by which efficiency is attained (in the Anglo-American model,
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reducing the size of government, reducing workers rights, the shareholder value
conception of the firm). It is useful to consider some of the surprising empirical evidence
about the link between trade, economic growth, and the size of government more
systematically.
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Figure 4: Trade and Social Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, 
1990 for OECD Countries (Source: Rodrik, 1996)
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Figure 4 presents a graph that shows the relationship between the percentage of
an economy's GDP that is involved in trade and the size of its government for OECD
countries. The graph clearly shows that the most trade dependent societies have the
largest, not the smallest governments. Rodrik has done an econometric study that
included over 100 countries from the 1960s until the 1990s (1996). He concludes that
this relationship occurs because societies where trade is more important have
compensated for the risks of trade by using government spending to insure some
stability. His results also show that higher exports at an earlier point in time are
associated with increased not decreased spending. These empirical results fly in the face
of neoliberal thinking about states and markets. If competitive world markets have been
putting pressure on states to shrink, why has the opening up of markets for world trade
caused their expansion?
Garrett (1995) has presented evidence that the main cause of this growth in
government protection in OECD countries is the interaction between the presence of
powerful left political parties, trade unions, and high levels of trade. The high degree of
protection offered by states more susceptible to world market forces results mostly from
organized politics. Garrett also has evidence that high levels of trade does dampen taxes
on capital as well, which is in support the neoliberal argument.
Have the actions of states, which have grown in the past 30 years, made their
economies grow slower and create fewer jobs? Put another way, while it might have
been good politics to protect citizens and use the state as a countercyclical employer of
last resort, it might have made for poor economic performance. The econometric
evidence for the effects of different forms of government spending, measures of union
power such as national collective bargaining, on employment and growth do not support
the view that the "efficiency-equity" trade-off is straightforward.
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The empirical literature on this question either looks at highly aggregated data
over time, or case studies of particular interventions in particular societies. There is good
evidence that government investment in infrastructure and education has paid off for
economic growth in societies (Aschauer, 1991). The comparative c p talisms literature
has demonstrated fairly effectively that governments have played positive roles in the
development process as well (Evans, 1995; Campos and Root, 1996; Wade, 1990). The
literature comparing specific industrial policies and their effectiveness for advanced
industrial societies offers both positive and negative evidence for the role of
governments (Johnson, 1980; Herrigel, 1996; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; for a recent
review see Pauly and Reich, 1997). But the overall evidence does not point in the
direction of big activist states having overwhelmingly negative effects on growth.
Most economic theories tend to see distortions in lab r markets that are due to
union power as producing labor market rigidities. Minimum wages, collective
bargaining, and social policies that make it difficult or expensive for firms to hire or fire
workers can be shown to theoretically reduce employment and raise unemployment. But
the empirical literature on these issues turns out to be more ambiguous. For example, the
recent OECD report on jobs tries to look at how various forms of collective bargaining
have effected economic growth and job creation in OECD countries in the past 20 years
(1994). The results are worth quoting: "While higher unionization and more co-
ordinated bargaining lead to less earnings inequality, it is more difficult to find consistent
and clear relationships between those key characteristics of collective bargaining systems
and aggregate employment, unemployment, or economic growth" (1994: 2).
This brief review pushes us to a startling conclusion. There is no evidence that
trade has made states "smaller" over the past 30 years. In fact, it is quite the opposite.
There is evidence that high exposure to trade combined with organized labor has
produced more social protection and larger states. There are theoretical reasons to
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believe that states continue to matter in producing economic growth by providing public
goods, the stable rule of law, and under certain conditions, good industrial policy. There
is little evidence that unions or collective bargaining lessens job growth systematically or
increases unemployment. There is evidence that a strong labor movement and l bor party
act to redistribute income and raise wages in society in general.
There is also little evidence that the competitiveness of firms in industries
characterized by world trade a e driven primarily by differences in wage rates. Instead, it
is innovation in technology and organization that provides distinct competitive
advantages (Porter, 1985). This set of conclusions based on current the rizing in
economics and the current knowledge available in the empirical literature are totally
contradictory to the claims of globologists. States are not disappearing, inequality is not
increasing everywhere, and low lab r costs and weak protection of workers are not the
main engine of economic growth in any industrial society with the exception of America.
Table 5: Unemployment (Column 1) and GDP Growth (Column 2) in selected
developed countries, 1975-1995
Country      1975          1980          1985          1990          1995
                   (1)  (2)      (1)  (2)       (1)  (2)      (1)  (2)       (1)  (2)
U.S.            4.8 -1.7      7.0  -.2      5.4  2.7      6.7  1.0      5.6  3.2
Japan         1.9  2.4      2.0  4.2      2.6  3.7     2.1  5.6      2.9  3.4
W. Germ.   3.6 -3.3      2.9  1.8     7.1  2.5      4.8  4.6     6.5  1.6
France        4.0 -1.3      6.2  1.7    10.2  1.4     8.9  2.4    12.3  1.0
Italy            5.3 -3.5      7.5  4.0     9.6  2.3     10.3  2.2    9.5  4.2
U. K.           4.3 -1.3     6.4 -1.4    11.2  3.7      6.8  1.0    9.6  2.5
Canada       6.9   .6       7.4  3.3    10.4  4.0      8.1   .9     9.5  4.2
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators (Paris, 1996), table 2.7
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It is useful to turn to the case of Europe as compared to the U.S. in the past 15
years. It is here that arguments about global competition and the role of the state in
industrial competitiveness are getting their most serious airing (Crouch and Streeck,
1996; Boyer and Drache, 1996; Dore and Strange, 1997; European Union, 1997) Table
5 presents data on unemployment and economic growth in the past 20 years. In we ern
Europe, unemployment rates began to grow in the early 1980s and have remained high
in both recessions and periods of economic growth. American unemployment rates have
gone up and down depending on economic conditions. This data has frequently been
taken as evidence that European work rules prevent employers from hiring workers and
that the slow economic growth of the past 15 years is due to these practices which
prevent labor markets from clearing. Because American firms can respond to
opportunities by hiring workers and downturns by laying them off, they are more likely
to create new jobs. Because European firms cannot take on new workers easily, they
forego opportunities and therefore, in the aggregate the effect is slow economic growth.
There are a number of c unterarguments to this interpretation of the data. First,
it places an enormous theoretical burden on one variable as the cause of slow European
economic growth. It postulates that European firms are responding to only one factor in
deciding whether or not to make decisions on new investment: labor costs. This flies in
the face of most theories of markets which usually suggest that investments are made
because people believe that demand exists for products. High factor costs could effect
investment, but it is only one part of the investment decision.
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Table 6: Part-time Employment in 1993
                    % Males 20-64
                         Parttime
                         Employment
                         (1993)
U.S.                   11.5
Japan               11.4
W. Germany     2.9
France             4.1
Italy                  2.5
U.K.                  6.6
Canada             9.8
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook (Paris, 1995), table 2.14
Second, the data on unemployment should not be accepted at face value. Table 6
presents evidence on the prevalence of part-time employment amongst prime age
working males across societies. The U.S. has almost 12% of its work force employed
part-time. In Germany and France, these numbers are 2.9 and 4.1% respectively.
Surveys have revealed that in the U.S., more than half of the part-time workers wish
they had full-time jobs. Since Europeans often have the choice about whether or not to
work because of high unemployment and health benefits, involuntary part-time
employment is relatively minor. If one adds these workers (about 6%) to the U.S.
unemployment figure, one can see that U.S. and European unemployment rates begin to
converge more than they diverge. Put another way, Europe's generous level of social
benefits mean that workers have the choice to be selective about work, while in the U.S.,
workers have no choice but to work. They must accept part-time work when they
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cannot find full time work. Indeed, if we add involuntary part-time workers and
discouraged workers to the unemployment rates, the U.S. performance over the past
decade looks less stunning.
European societies have chosen policies that operate with more open economies
(witness the higher level of export dependence), but also have ones that offer more
social protection. The OECD societies that have been the most open to trade, ie. w stern
Europe, have the highest social welfare benefits in the world and relatively low amounts
of wage and income inequality. While in the U.S., the least dependent on trade, has the
fewest benefits, and tolerates the highest levels of income and wage inequality.
Unemployment in Europe is very high compared to the U.S. But, a large part of that gap
is attributable to low U.S. benefits which force involuntary part-time employment.
Europeans' social safety nets make them less poor and less likely to have to accept work
that they do not want. During the economic troubles of the 1990s, there have been some
revisions in European welfare states benefits, but they remain well above U.S. levels
(Kitschelt, et. al, forthcoming).
Crisis, what Crisis?
I hope that my quick run down of some of the important patterns of the evidence
regarding the amount of globalization, its character, and its alleged effects on
deindustrialization, income inequality, and the alleged demise of welfare states has at
least shaken reader's confidence in the claim of globologistsof every sort. There is not
clear evidence that globalization, however defined, has changed qualitatively in the past
15 years and there is even less evidence that it is mostly responsible for increases in
inequality across OECD countries.
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A counterargument goes, then what is all the chatter about and why do states
appear so fiscally strained? I would like to argue that welfare states, particularly in
Europe, are experiencing stress, but the causes have more to do with domestic
economics and politics than local ones. Similarly, the situation in America is also being
driven by domestic politics. In a society with low tax rates by world standards and the
lowest budget deficit on a proportional basis, balancing the budget and cutting taxes
have characterized the politics of the 1990s.
The major factor in the attacks on the European welfare states stem from the
failure of social democratic and Keynsian policies to stimulate the European economies.
The Single Market Program of the EU has helped increase trade, but not enough to
produce additional growth in the EU. Unemployment has remained high in Europe since
the late 1970s and economic growth is best described as sluggish. All current economic
policies appear to be simply failing. A recent report by the European Community
highlighted the problem of job creation in Europe (1997). This report took the view that
the main problem was that it was difficult for small firms to grow, both because of the
difficulty of getting access to capital, but also because of regulations and tax levels
which made it hard for small and medium size enterprises to start up.
Pressures on welfare states for spending are increasing in two ways. Because of
slow growth, there has been high and persistent unemployment across Europe and this is
expensive to support. The aging of the populations has also produced more demand for
health care and social security. The European pension systems are in disastrous shape,
much worse than the U.S. European welfare states consume about 45-50% of their
societies' GDP and offer generous benefits (Usitillo, 1995). Now that many of them have
committed to the trying to form a single currency, it is increasingly difficult to run
deficits.
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Another big problem for European welfare states is the end of the Cold War.
From the perspective of the "left", social democracy was a humane way to deal with the
problems created by capitalism. From the perspective of the right, European social
democracy (and American support of it was predicated on this) was a bulwark against
communism. While it might have placed a lot of emphasis on equality, it was still
democratic.  The end of the Soviet Union has produced an intellectual threat for social
democracy as the right can now argue that social democracy restricts freedom and
undermines initiative, as it did the Soviet Union. Intellectually, social democrats are on
the defensive.
The failure of communism to provide a just society and perhaps, the intellectual
exhaustion of social democracy means there is a lack of a clear alternative political
agenda. It is easy to see neoliberalism as a capitalist plot. But, the problem is, that social
democratic redistributive policies and classical Keynsian approaches to stimulating the
economy (running deficits and cutting taxes) are not working. So, ne liberalism with its
agenda of deregulation, tax cutting, and cutting back on welfare state policies, is viewed
as the only set of alternatives.
Herbert Kitshelt (1995) has shown that support for social democratic parties has
eroded as the economy has shifted from blue collar manufacturing to service workers.
Electoral support for the welfare states has eroded as younger workers employed in
services are more sceptical of governments and vote more with conservative parties.
Yet, in spite of slow growing economies, high unemployment, high taxes, generous
welfare states, and breakdowns of traditional social democratic coalitions, no European
society except for Britain has tried to make serious cutbacks. Outside of the Tory Party
in Britain, no large party exists in western Europe that claims to want to engage in
taking apart the welfare states (and the degree to which this actually occurred in Britain
is not so clear, see Pierson, 1994). This does not mean that these societies will not have
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changes or that the changes that have occurred are not real. But Europeans support
equity in their societies and remain firmly supportive of their current social
arrangements. All political parties including left, center, and right do not want to
dismantle the welfare state, but undertake actions to reform it in order to preserve it
(Kluegel, et. al., 1995).
Globalization and Neoliberalism as an American Project
The American economy during the 1970s was beset by high inflation, slow
economic growth, and poor performance by large firms. The causes of this "malaise" are
complex, but begin with the first "oil shock" in 1973. What is interesting and important,
is how this crisis became "defined" and "solved". When Ronald Reagan came to power
in 1980, he did so with the idea that markets were a better way to organize society than
governments. He proposed a deregulatory agenda whereby taxes were cut, government
regulation attacked, and government was to be cut.
In the core of the American economy, the idea took hold that firms were nothing
more than their balance sheets and their basic function was to provide returns to owners
or shareholders. Therefore, assets on balance sheets that were underperforming were to
be sold off, and the profits either dispersed to shareholders or reinvested where higher
rates of return might appear. This view of the firm was a response to the 1970s where
managers had decided in the face of low stock market prices, high asset inflation, and
high interest rates, to understate the value of their assets and finance their expansions
with cash (Friedman, 1987). Financial investors began to realize that because of low
stock prices, firms could be bought up and broken up, with the potential for great gain.
So, began the merger movement of the 1980s.
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The shareholder value conception of the firm emerged from financial economics
(see, Jensen, 1989 for a polemic on this point), and argued that financial performance
was the only criteria to invoke in making strategic decisions. Public policy reinforced this
view. The conservative rhetoric of personal responsibility and the intimation that
everything governments did was bad, while everything that occurred in and around
markets was good, became dominant. The increases in income, wage, and wealth
inequality that resulted from these processes was seen to be natural. Analysts of the
American economy began to see this "new model" as the solution to America's
competition problems from the 1970s, and the Japanese challenge of the early 1980s
(again, see Jensen, 1989). A focus on shareholder value would make firms "lean and
mean" and this would aid them in competition, both domestically, but also against the
Japanese. Firms should maximize profits for owners and governments should just stay
out of it. This ideology is a generalization about the American experience.
For Europeans, the U.S. economy from afar appeared to be booming and
creating jobs, while theirs appear to be failing. People like straightforward stories that
suggest exactly how to get the outcomes they want. But there are lots of dangers in this
particular story. Europeans do not appreciate how much inequality there is in America
and how little governments do to help people. This has intensified as firms defeated
labor, redeployed assets, and laid off workers and managers. One interesting question, is,
does this set of ideas work? The answer, of course, depends on what you mean. While
American firms have increased their exports substantially, the U.S. continues to run a
substantial trade deficit. "Lean and mean" American firms have not regained competitive
advantage in industries like consumer electronics and automobiles. The U.S. economy
has been rebuilt on lowering the wages of most workers. But lower wage costs have not
translated into competitive advantage across all markets. This, of course, is what our
theories of competitive advantage would predict. If market advantage is driven by
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organizational f ctors and technology, factor prices like the price of labo  will produce
competitive advantage only where in the peculiar situations they are decisive.
Conclusion
I have tried to provide arguments and evidence against accepting too quickly the
neoliberal and eomarxist view that the globalization of production has produced a new
stage of capitalism, one where inequality will increase, governments are increasingly
irrelevant, and the tyranny of the skilled meritocracy will reign. We are in a period of
change, but I would suggest that what is lacking is a normative argument to make sense
of these changes.
There are two normative issues I would like to emphasize. First, we should resist
globalization as a rhetorical device to justify any social or economic policies that do not
directly follow in an empirically observable fashion. Free trade has proved to increase the
wealth of nations. There is, however, no empirical evidence suggesting that removing
social safety nets for people and making them insecure, contributes to making firms
more competitive in their respective markets or produces long term economic growth.
Second, since corporations depend on states to produce rules to govern markets,
firms' relations, property rights, barriers and access to trading and more generally public
goods for all to consume, they have responsibilities to society more generally. In Europe,
the leaders of most large firms feel this responsibility, like the members of their societies
as a whole. They consider themselves members of society and because of that
membership, they are in a partnership with society. This idea sounds utopian to
Americans where there are only shareholder, not stakeholder rights in corporations. But,
this kind of moral agreement is what makes European social democracies special, and so
51
far able to resist the siren song of American style markets. As new markets become
integrated on a larger scale, there will be demand for more, not less government.
This stage of capitalism is not about globalization and why it will reduce all of us
to either being winners or losers. Instead, the real problems of advanced societies are
being subsumed into the globalization rhetoric as a universalization of the American
experience. The claim that others must accept downsizing, insecurity, increased
inequality, and less access to health care, housing and education as a consequence of the
domination of the world market is just that: a claim. I have tried to show that the facts
undermine or call into question this claim.
Capitalist firms need governments and societies to extract wealth for their
shareholders. Social justice means recognizing these interdependencies and trying to use
them to spell out rights and responsibilities. Societies have successfully produced just
systems of social protection and provided opportunity and economic growth for their
citizens. These should not be looked upon as alternatives, but as complementary. 
One of my main purposes in writing this paper has been to highlight the difficulty
of countering the rhetoric of globalization. Policymakers who accept arguments that
world trade is undermining the competitiveness of their firms will make policies as if it is
true. If they believe that lowering labor costs and making workers more unequal is the
only way to solve this problem, they will act on that belief. I am not saying that is is
impossible for changes in world markets to have important effects on given sectors or
indeed, whole societies. But I am saying that careful scholarship is necessary to prove
such claims in any particular situation. The overwhelming evidence, as it stands now,
does not support the economic gl balization thesis and the Anglo-American policy
proscriptions. Instead, the problems of advanced industrial societies can be traced back
to the recent developments in their national economies and polities.
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 Appendix A
Assembling statistics over a long period of time on world trade, world GDP, and
the trade shares on countries, is a difficult task. There are two problems. First, gathering
comparable data for each year is difficult. This necessitated using multiple sources.
Multiple sources were also consulted to attempt to see if the different agencies that
reported these statistics reported similar numbers. There were enough small
discrepancies in statistics that one should be cautious in overinterpreting the
performance of any single year.
Second, the calculation of the world GDP is problematic. If world GDP is
calculated in dollars, then it will reflect inflation in the dollar and currency fluctuations.
Since GDP has often been used as an indicator of economic development, a gr at deal
of effort has gone into making sure that the calculation of national GDP is not clouded
by these fluctuations. Trade statistics are always reported in current dollars, while world
GDP is often adjusted for varying factors. I have solved this problem by gathering a
measure of world GDP in current dollars. Thus, the calculation of the percentage of
world economic activity accounted for by trade is defined as: world trade in current
dollars/ world GDP in current dollars.
The raw data are available from the author.
Sources (multiple sources imply that series either had breaks in them or multiple
sources were consulted in order to assure comparability):
United Nations Statistical Yearbook, Series from 1953-1997. Data on World GDP,
Trade statistics, shares of trade for developed countries, trade flows between countries,
manufacturing trade flows.
Trends in the International Distribution of Gross World Product, 1970-89 , 1990, New
York: United Nations. World GDP.
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World Trade Statistics , GATT (in 1995, GATT becomes the WTO (World Trade
Organization)), Series from 1962-97. data on world trade broken down by industries,
trade flows between developed and developing societies.
Main Economic Indicators, OECD, Annual series 1971-1997. Data on world trade,
flows, shares to countries and regions.
